



USAF COUNTERPROLIFERATION CENTER
CPC OUTREACH JOURNAL
Maxwell AFB, Alabama

Issue No. 418, 24 March 2005

Articles & Other Documents:

[Egypt's quiet weapons build-up](#)

[China Balks At Pressing The North Koreans](#)

[Nuclear Power Is Good: U.S. And Iran Have No Argument There](#)

[Intelligence Fiasco' Stirs Up The Korean Peninsula](#)

[Virus New to Angola Kills 95; Travelers Told to Avoid North](#)

[Rice: U.S., Allies Discussed 'Options' Against N. Korea](#)

[N. Korea Is Willing To Return To Nuclear Talks, China Says](#)

[The Real Missile Defense Gap](#)

[Nuclear Accord Eludes Iran And Europeans](#)

Welcome to the CPC Outreach Journal. As part of USAF Counterproliferation Center's mission to counter weapons of mass destruction through education and research, we're providing our government and civilian community a source for timely counterproliferation information. This information includes articles, papers and other documents addressing issues pertinent to US military response options for dealing with nuclear, biological and chemical threats and attacks. It's our hope this information resource will help enhance your counterproliferation issue awareness.

Established in 1998, the USAF/CPC provides education and research to present and future leaders of the Air Force, as well as to members of other branches of the armed services and Department of Defense. Our purpose is to help those agencies better prepare to counter the threat from weapons of mass destruction. Please feel free to visit our web site at www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/awc-cps.htm for in-depth information and specific points of contact. Please direct any questions or comments on CPC Outreach Journal Jo Ann Eddy, CPC Outreach Editor, at (334) 953-7538 or DSN 493-7538. To subscribe, change e-mail address, or unsubscribe to this journal or to request inclusion on the mailing list for CPC publications, please contact Mrs. Eddy.

The following articles, papers or documents do not necessarily reflect official endorsement of the United States Air Force, Department of Defense, or other US government agencies. Reproduction for private use or commercial gain is subject to original copyright restrictions. All rights are reserved

MSNBC.com

Egypt's quiet weapons build-up

U.S., Russia, others gather data on development of WMDs

By Robert Windrem

Investigative producer

NBC News

Updated: 1:47 p.m. ET March 17, 2005

NEW YORK - A number of documents NBC News has obtained from the United States, Russia and Israel — some of it public, some declassified under the Freedom of Information Act — help shed some light on Egypt's steady development of several weapons of mass destruction programs over the past decade and a half, including its nuclear potential and details of a joint North Korean-Egyptian missile development agreement.

The overall impression of officials in the United States, as well as those in Israel and Russia, is that Egypt has quietly been developing weapons, in particular biological weapons and missiles.

Much of Egypt's superweapons development, of course, is aimed at countering Israel's long standing and large-scale superweapons programs, as well as establishing itself as the leading power in the Arab world.

Israel's weapons of mass destruction program is daunting, even to the first Arab state that signed a peace treaty with the Jewish state. With an estimated 200 nuclear warheads, more than Great Britain, and 100 medium-range missiles, Israel is in a world of diminishing nuclear programs, a regional superpower, at least.

Still, while Egypt continues to point an accusing finger at Israel's nuclear weapons capability, there is considerable evidence that Egypt has been quietly building up its own superweapons programs, including some evidence of interest in nuclear and radiological weapons.

In other words, Egypt may not have clean hands.

The United States has growing concerns that Egypt is working on several weapons programs it sees as destabilizing to Middle East peace.

During the past decade and a half, both the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (FIS) and the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) have publicly noted the existence of programs previously unknown. The following is a breakdown of what the documents say about Egypt's weapons systems development programs.

Evidence of nuclear build-up

The most revealing document is the Russian intelligence document, produced by the KGB's successor organization, the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service or FIS. An extraordinary public document, it was issued at a time of extraordinary public openness and has not been updated since.

In the document, "Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction," issued on Jan. 28, 1993, the Russians noted that although there is "no special program of military-applied research in the [Egyptian] nuclear sphere," there are some developments of note.

- ☐ The development of the 22-MW research reactor at Inshas, north of Cairo, built with help from Argentina;
- ☐ Egypt has contracted with India to upgrade a 30-year-old Soviet research reactor from 2-MW to 5-MW;
- ☐ Egypt has contracted with Russia to supply a MGD-20 cyclotron accelerator which would be helpful in exploring uranium enrichment technologies;
- ☐ Egypt has begun building a facility at its Inshas research center, which the Russians noted "in its design features and engineering protection could in the future be used to obtain weapons-grade plutonium from the uranium irradiated in the research reactors."

In addition, NBC News obtained the U.S. Customs Service debriefing of Abdel Kadr Helmy, an Egyptian spy, jailed in the 1980's for trying to obtain various missile technologies, including Pershing-II guidance packages. Helmy said in the debrief — which he now disavows — that Egypt had an active nuclear weapons development program that included sending uranium to Pakistan for enrichment to bomb-grade levels. Helmy said that an Egyptian Brigadier, Ahmad Nashet, ran both the civilian nuclear establishment in Cairo, as well as the nascent bomb program.

Development of chemical weapons

The Egyptians are also interested in chemical weapons. The Russian FIS document specifically noted, "Techniques of the production of nerve-paralyzing and blister-producing toxic agents have been assimilated."

Furthermore, the FIS report stated: "There is information to the effect that Egypt is displaying interest in purchases overseas of warheads intended for filling with liquid chemical warfare agents. The stockpiles of toxic substances available at this time are insufficient for broad-based operations, but the industrial potential would permit the development of the additional production in a relatively short time."

It may very well be that the warheads the Russians discussed were ultimately bound for Iraq.

Confirmation of biological weapons program

Similarly, the Egyptians have a biological weapons program, according to recent statements by the Russian FIS, as well as the U.S. CIA and Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA).

"At the start of the 1970's," the FIS document stated, "President Sadat confirmed this, announcing the presence in Egypt of a stockpile of biological agents stored in refrigerating plants. Toxins of varying nature are being studied and techniques for their production and refinement are being developed at the present time in a [unnamed] national research center."

In response to a question during a U.S. Senate Government Affairs Committee hearing on Feb. 24, 1993 regarding proliferation concerns, then CIA Director R. James Woolsey confirmed that Egypt is counted as a nation with biological weapons capability.

Annual U.S. ACDA reports on treaty compliance similarly listed Egypt as a probable biological weapons state.

In three annual reports to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee since 1995, ACDA has used the same language to assess the Egyptian program: "The United States believes that Egypt had developed biological agents by 1972.

There is no evidence to indicate that Egypt has eliminated this capability and it remains likely that the Egyptian capability to conduct biological warfare continues to exist."

What is also interesting about these subsequent reports is that unlike a similar report in 1994, ACDA did not include this sentence: "The United States however has not however obtained recent information on this program," the implication being that the U.S. did receive damning information about the program starting in 1995.

The Russian FIS was less circumspect in its 1993 report, stating: "The country has a program of militarily applied research in the area of biological weapons, but no data have been obtained to indicate the creation of biological agents in support of military offensive programs. The research program in the area of biological weapons date back to the 1960's."

Strides in missile development, thanks to North Korea

The area where Egypt excels is in missile development.

The Russians FIS report noted: "By 1990, Egypt's missile forces were armed with a regiment each of Soviet Scud-B [approximately 186 miles] and Frog 7 [approximately 43 miles] transporter-erector-launchers and also a certain quantity of Sakr 80 and Sakr 365 Egyptian-Iraqi-North Korean short-range missiles. It is technically possible to fit the Scud and Frog warheads with chemical weapons.

"An agreement was concluded in 1990 on military cooperation with China in accordance with which Beijing is to assist in the modernization of the Egyptian Sakr plant and help establish the production of new modifications of the Scud B-class missiles and three domestic types of Egyptian surface-to-surface missiles."

A 1992 Israeli Defense Force (IDF) memorandum on Mid East missile programs provided this appraisal of the Egyptian program: "Egypt attaches great importance to the acquisition of GGM [Ground-to-Ground Missile] and to the building of a congruent technological infrastructure. During the 1950s, and aided by German Nazi scientists, a concerted effort was made to build factories which would manufacture missiles. This effort continued over the years; at present the Egyptian army diverts resources to this endeavor.

"Egypt's principal GGM [Ground-to-Ground Missile] focus is on the Scud, at source a Russian ballistic missile.

Cairo would like to build the infrastructure which would enable it to assemble its own Scuds, with the aid of foreign countries and companies. North Korea is Egypt's main ally in this regard.

"At the beginning of the 1980s North Korea bought tens of Scud-B missiles from the Egyptians. The Scud-B is a medium range missile (approximately 174 miles), originally Russian, capable of carry a warhead of up to one ton.

"In return, the North Koreans helped the Egyptians set up the infrastructure for missile production and assembly. This was done via North Korean scientists and the transfer of North Korean technology. Work is continuing in these factories at present; they are said to begin active production in 1993."

Similarly, the FIS noted, "Using technology obtained from Egypt the DPRK [Democratic People's Republic of Korea] is upgrading the Scud-class missiles purchased earlier in the USSR and exporting them to countries of the Near and Middle East."

Condor-II missile development

In addition, testimony by U.S. Customs Service agent Daniel Burns before the House Ways & Means Oversight Subcommittee during an April 18, 1991 hearing about "Administration & Enforcement of U.S. Export Controls" bolstered the belief in Egypt's sophisticated missile development program.

Burns testified about conversations he had with Abdelkader Helmy, an Egyptian-American rocket scientist who had pleaded guilty to helping Cairo obtain equipment and material for the Condor-II missile. The missile was a joint project of Egypt, Argentina and Iraq. In his testimony, Burns said Helmy discussed with him several projects including:

- ☐ "The financing of the [Condor-II] program by Iraq and Saudi Arabia, and the roles of Egypt and Argentina and Iraq;"

- ☐ "the Egyptian effort to develop a nuclear warhead, including the Cobalt-60 effort and the purchase of uranium from France;"

- ☐ "the outline of the Scud missile joint development program between Egypt and North Korea;"

- ☐ "the details of an Iraqi chemical warhead and its planned utilization;"

- ☐ "the knowledge of President Mubarak of the Condor program and the fact that he approved it in 1984;" and

- ☐ "the modification of the SCUD and SS-10 missile."

Furthermore, Burns testified that, "I also developed information in some of the other corporations that he had been in contact with during this investigation — that he had approached the Coleman Research Corp., located down in Huntsville, about obtaining Stinger guidance systems...early in our wiretap investigation we overheard him being asked to check on the remotely piloted vehicle, known as the "Scarab" that was being built by Teledyne Ryan, which is, essentially, for the lack of a better word, the poor man's cruise missile."

Helmy, in his own testimony that day, discussed the North Korean-Egyptian Scud-B upgrade program. Helmy said, "The Scud-B, I knew everything...from the Egyptian official...the other relationship with the Koreans, I knew it."

The Cobalt-60 comment is particularly revealing since Cobalt-60 is an ideal warhead for a radiological bomb or "dirty" bomb, that is, a bomb which disperses a radioactive material on detonation.

Robert Windrem is a senior investigative producer for NBC News' Nightly News with Brian Williams.
<http://msnbc.msn.com/id/7206187/>

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

Washington Post
March 22, 2005
Pg. 13

Rice: U.S., Allies Discussed 'Options' Against N. Korea

By Glenn Kessler, Washington Post Staff Writer

BEIJING, March 21 -- Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said Monday that she had raised the prospect with Asian allies over the weekend of imposing economic or political penalties against North Korea if its government persisted in refusing to return to six-nation talks aimed at ending its nuclear ambitions.

In remarks at the conclusion of her week-long tour of Asia, Rice said she had discussed using "other options in the international system" against North Korea, the first time a senior U.S. official has publicly acknowledged the possibility of shifting to an aggressive campaign to isolate North Korea if the talks remain dormant. U.S. officials said the options could include tighter strictures on North Korea's illicit trade in arms and drugs and referring the matter to the U.N. Security Council.

Rice, who returned to Washington late Monday, stressed that most of her conversations in Japan, South Korea and China over the weekend were focused on generating ideas on how to convince the government in Pyongyang, the North Korean capital, to return to the negotiating table. A key goal of her trip was to press China, North Korea's main economic benefactor, to use its considerable leverage to force a return to the talks. Russia is also a participant in the negotiations.

North Korea announced on Feb. 10 that it possessed nuclear weapons and was pulling out of the talks because of the Bush administration's "hostile policy." On Monday, North Korean state media said the country had increased its nuclear arsenal to help prevent a U.S. attack, according to South Korea's semi-official Yonhap news agency.

The goal, Rice said, was to "not just get North Korea back to the table, but get North Korea back to the table ready to be constructive." If North Korea continues to balk, "then we will have to find other means to do it," she said. In an apparent reference to the United Nations, she noted that there were "other options in the international system."

[China announced early Tuesday that North Korea's premier, Pak Pong Ju, would visit Beijing beginning Tuesday in what was believed to be another Chinese attempt to arrange a resumption of the six-party talks. The official People's Daily said Pak would stay in China five days.]

U.S. officials traveling with Rice said the Chinese government had not been clear about its dealings with North Korea, making it difficult to determine whether China was actually delivering a tough message. But one official said Chinese officials appeared genuinely alarmed by North Korea's behavior.

Rice's decision to publicly acknowledge discussing other options with her Asian counterparts appeared aimed in part at prodding the Chinese to move quickly. On Sunday, before she flew to Beijing, Rice suggested that time was running out for a North Korean response. "We need to resolve this issue," she told reporters in Seoul. "It cannot go on forever."

U.S. intelligence officials have said they believe North Korea now possesses enough plutonium for at least eight nuclear weapons. The crisis over North Korea's atomic ambitions began in October 2002, when the Bush administration accused the government of having a program to enrich uranium in violation of a 1994 agreement freezing North Korea's nuclear weapons programs.

Rice carefully balanced her comments on the subject throughout the weekend. In a speech she gave in Japan, she offered conciliatory language, calling North Korea a "sovereign state" and stressing that the United States had made an offer to resolve the dispute last June.

Under that proposal, South Korea and other U.S. allies could provide immediate energy assistance to North Korea if it agreed to terminate its nuclear programs. The government in Pyongyang would have three months to disclose its programs and have its claims verified. The United States would then join its allies in giving written security assurances and participate in a process that might ultimately result in direct U.S. aid.

"The North Korean government can find the respect it desires and acquire the assistance it needs, if it is willing to make a strategic choice for peace," Rice told an audience at Tokyo's Sophia University.

A senior official traveling with Rice said her remarks were designed to afford the Chinese evidence they could present to the North Koreans showing the administration's flexibility and sincerity.

But in what North Korea might consider a bellicose act, she also flew to South Korea and toured Command Post Tango, a bunker built into a mountain that would serve as the command center during a war with North Korea. In a

room dominated by a video wall that displays maps and military intelligence, she hailed U.S. and South Korean troops working there as being on the "front lines of freedom."

There are nearly 33,000 U.S. troops in South Korea. Rice's visit occurred as thousands of American and South Korean troops participated in a one of their twice-yearly joint military exercises, which are regularly condemned by Pyongyang.

Rice's efforts to forge a common approach among the three nations she visited this weekend were hampered by a bitter territorial dispute between Japan and South Korea over a small island chain. Japan in recent weeks has reasserted claim to the islands, which are occupied by South Korea, rekindling anger in Seoul over Tokyo's wartime colonization of the Korean Peninsula.

South Korea's president, Roh Moo Hyun, appeared this month to belittle Japan's bilateral dispute with North Korea over the abduction of Japanese citizens by the Pyongyang government during the 1970s and 1980s -- an issue Tokyo says must be resolved before it would be willing to offer economic incentives to North Korea.

Correspondents Anthony Faiola in Seoul and Edward Cody in Beijing contributed to this report.

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A53646-2005Mar21.html>

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

New York Times

March 22, 2005

China Balks At Pressing The North Koreans

By Joel Brinkley

BEIJING, March 21 - Chinese government leaders have offered Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice no assurances that they will step up pressure on North Korea to return to nuclear disarmament talks, senior officials traveling with her said Monday.

For the last week, at every stop on her six-nation Asian tour, Ms. Rice has urged China to be more forceful with North Korea, as she did again on Monday, saying, "China, in particular, has an important role to play."

Japan's foreign minister, Nobutaka Machimura and South Korea's, Ban Ki Moon, also indicated during her visit that China may be in the best position to be persuasive. But in meetings here on Sunday and Monday with President Hu Jintao, Prime Minister Wen Jiabao and other government leaders, the officials said, Ms. Rice got nothing more than bland assurances that the Chinese officials would talk to the North Koreans again, without suggesting that they would apply any particular pressure. The Chinese did say that a senior North Korean official was to visit Beijing later this week.

If China does not increase the pressure on North Korea, it could undermine what has been a central plank of President Bush's strategy to enlist the help of North Korea's neighbors to contain its nuclear program. A refusal by China to take more aggressive steps could also empower those in the administration who believe that negotiations with the North are futile.

Perhaps responding to the lukewarm response from the Chinese, at the end of her visit here Ms. Rice said for the first time that the United States was beginning to think about what might be done should North Korea continue to refuse to talk.

"We at this point we are committed to the six-party talks," Ms. Rice said at a news conference on Monday. "But it goes without saying" that if North Korea's position does not change, "we will have to look at other options."

The officials would not say what action might come next, but one foreign diplomat with knowledge of the discussions said the parties would probably take their dispute to the United Nations Security Council. North Korea walked away from the talks last June, just after the other five parties - the United States, Japan, South Korea, China and Russia - offered the North Koreans security assurances, aid, fuel and other inducements if they would give up their nuclear weapons program. North Korea has not responded specifically to the offer but said last month that it had nuclear weapons and would not return to the talks.

The senior officials who discussed the matter declined to be identified because they did not want to upstage Ms. Rice.

They said China had asked Ms. Rice before she began her trip to restate the offer in public so North Korea could see what it had to gain by returning to the negotiations. She did that several times, most recently at a news conference in Seoul on Sunday: "The North Koreans know that the United States has said repeatedly that we have no intention of invading or attacking North Korea. And, in fact, if North Korea is prepared to make a strategic choice, we have said that within the context of the six-party talks, there could be security assurances for North Korea."

One senior official noted that China might still decide to put new pressure on North Korea, even though nothing was said during Ms. Rice's meetings to suggest that.

"We exchanged our points," he said, "and now we hope they will take them back and make a decision."

China has said it favors a non-nuclear Korean peninsula, while also emphasizing that it wants peace and stability on its northeastern border. It has engaged intensive diplomacy to arrange multiparty negotiations to address the issue, a crucial contribution when the Bush administration was bogged down in the Iraq war.

But it is not clear that the Chinese see the problem in the same terms the Bush administration does.

Chinese officials have repeatedly cast doubt on American intelligence estimates that North Korea has eight or nine workable nuclear devices. The Chinese have expressed ambiguity about whether North Korea has a secret program to extract nuclear fuel from uranium in addition to its better known effort to make bombs from plutonium. But it is those estimates that American officials say makes action urgent.

Some local analysts say that Chinese leaders may be more worried about the possibility that the reclusive North Korean regime might suddenly collapse, or that the United States might decide to strike militarily, than they are by the possibility that the North has a small number of so-far untested nuclear warheads.

The officials said the Chinese repeated the explanation they have often given: that they do not have as much influence with North Korea as is widely believed, an assertion that many American and foreign officials say they discount. But this time, the officials said, the Chinese also expressed their own frustrations with the North Koreans' recent behavior.

The Chinese also urge the United States to offer "flexibility" to North Korea, an official said. "Flexibility" is regarded as code for offering incentives or concessions to the North Koreans. South Korea has also offered that view in the past.

During her news conference, Ms. Rice emphasized the positive elements of her discussions with the Chinese leaders, but she also alluded to some other frustrations.

"We had extensive discussions," she said, "about the need to enforce intellectual property rights." That means stopping the sale of pirated software, movies and compact discs.

A senior State Department official, briefing reporters Saturday night, said that Prime Minister Wen had recited "Chinese efforts in each of these fields in terms of prosecution for intellectual property fraud, or movement on structural reform."

On the sidewalk outside the hotel this afternoon, a street vendor was hawking a DVD of "The Aviator," which is not scheduled to come out officially for several months, for \$1.75. A police officer on patrol took no particular notice.

<http://www.nytimes.com/2005/03/22/international/asia/22rice.html?>

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

Los Angeles Times

March 23, 2005

N. Korea Is Willing To Return To Nuclear Talks, China Says

By Associated Press

BEIJING — Chinese officials said Tuesday that North Korea's premier had told them the country might be willing to return to nuclear disarmament talks, despite its threat to indefinitely boycott the negotiations and its claim that it had expanded its atomic arsenal.

"If conditions are right in the future, North Korea is willing at any time to participate at the six-party talks," Premier Pak Pong Chu told his Chinese counterpart, Wen Jiabao, on Tuesday, a spokesman for the Chinese Foreign Ministry said.

The spokesman, Liu Jianchao, didn't say what those conditions were. But the North previously demanded that the United States end its "hostile policy" and apologize for having referred to the country as an outpost of tyranny.

Washington has appealed to China's communist leaders to prod their ally back to the bargaining table, and suggested that North Korea might face sanctions if it didn't cooperate.

Wen told Pak the six-nation talks were the "only real, pragmatic way to resolve the nuclear issue," Liu said. The two leaders were meeting at the Great Hall of the People, the seat of China's parliament, in central Beijing.

Pak also was scheduled to meet with President Hu Jintao. His trip includes a stop in Shanghai, China's financial capital.

U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, visiting Beijing, hinted at sanctions Monday, saying that if talks failed to produce a nonnuclear North Korea, "we'll have to look at other options."

Rice said she had appealed for China to use its status as the North's main ally and aid donor to draw it back to the talks, which also include South Korea, Japan and Russia.

China is believed to supply the North with up to a third of its food and a quarter of its energy. Beijing insists it has little influence over the Stalinist regime.

Analysts say the North's declaration last month that it had nuclear weapons might prompt China to coerce the country back into talks. But they say Beijing might be holding out for a U.S. overture that would make the North return willingly.

A North Korean official said last week during a visit to South Africa that it was up to Washington to create the right conditions for new talks. China has organized three rounds of talks so far.

U.S. and Chinese diplomats met last week in Shanghai with their counterparts from Japan and South Korea to discuss possible steps to get North Korea back to the bargaining table. The North is seeking aid and a peace treaty with the United States.

Tension between the U.S. and North Korea flared in 2002 when Washington said the regime had begun a nuclear program in violation of a 1994 pact that gave it oil and other aid for abandoning such efforts.

<http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-korea23mar23,1,1890529.story?coll=la-headlines-world>

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

New York Times

March 23, 2005

Nuclear Power Is Good: U.S. And Iran Have No Argument There

By Elaine Sciolino

PARIS, March 22 - In an unadorned conference center at the French Ministry of Finance, the United States and Iran discovered this week that they had something in common. They are both passionate cheerleaders for nuclear power. It's just that the United States wants to deny Iran the right to develop its own nuclear power capacity.

In a speech on Monday at a two-day conference on "nuclear energy for the 21st century," Constance Morella, the American ambassador to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, told an audience of government officials and nuclear experts from more than 70 countries that American support of nuclear energy "has never been stronger." Nuclear energy is clean, reliable, necessary for the world to have a secure energy supply and "a benefit to humankind," she said.

Ms. Morella cited a study estimating that global energy demand was expected to rise by about 60 percent over the next 25 years.

"America hasn't ordered a nuclear power plant since the 1970's, and it's time to start building again," she quoted President Bush as saying recently.

In a speech on Tuesday, Mohammad Saeidi, a vice president of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, delivered more or less the same message. Citing Iran's half-century history of developing nuclear energy, he called the generation of nuclear power "the prime priority" of Iran's nuclear program. Oil and natural gas "are limited and belong to all subsequent generations, and unrestrained use of this source of energy is not prudent," he said.

The only problem with the presentations was what the speakers left out.

The United States wants nuclear energy plants for itself. But it believes Iran's uranium enrichment programs have nuclear bombs and not electricity as their goal. In a de facto reinterpretation of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, the Bush administration has taken the position that a country like Iran is too dangerous to be allowed the technology to produce nuclear material for electricity, even if the treaty itself does not explicitly ban it.

On Wednesday, officials from France, Britain and Germany, which negotiated a temporary freeze on Iran's uranium enrichment activities last November, will meet in Paris with Iranian officials to review three months of negotiations toward a permanent settlement of Iran's nuclear plans. While the United States is convinced that Iran is hiding a secret weapons program, the three European countries are less categorical in their assessment. Still, the Europeans' suspicions are serious enough that they are negotiating to persuade Iran to give up its uranium enrichment program permanently in exchange for political and economic incentives. (Uranium enrichment is a process that can be used to make nuclear material for use in either electricity or bombs.)

Iran, by contrast, has declared that it would never abandon its right to enrich uranium, and in his speech on Tuesday, Mr. Saeidi reaffirmed that Iran would pursue a full-scale nuclear program. "The people and government of Iran are determined to open their way through the tortuous path of peaceful use of nuclear technology despite all imposed restrictions and difficulties," he said. He called research activities, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes an "inalienable right" of signers of the nonproliferation treaty - "without discrimination."

Mr. Saeidi did not mention Iran's agreement with the Europeans or the continuing negotiations. In fact, he described some of Iran's nuclear facilities as if all were functioning normally, even though some are not operating because of the freeze. In her speech in Paris, made in the name of Energy Secretary Samuel Bodman, Ms. Morella never uttered the word "Iran." However, she said the pursuit of civilian nuclear power must not be diverted to dangerous weapons programs, citing, among other things, the importance of universal adherence to the additional protocol of the nonproliferation treaty.

The additional protocol is a supplement to the treaty that substantially expands the ability of the International Atomic Energy Agency, the United Nations nuclear monitoring agency, to check for clandestine nuclear facilities. Ms. Morella did not point out that the United States signed the protocol in 1998 but that Congress has never approved it, so the United States has yet to put it in place.

<http://www.nytimes.com/2005/03/23/international/middleeast/23iran.html?pagewanted=all>

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

Washington Post

March 23, 2005

Pg. 15

The Real Missile Defense Gap

By David Ignatius

Here's a macabre defense quiz for the post-Sept. 11 world: Which kind of attack on the United States is more likely over the next 20 years -- a ballistic missile launched from another continent, or a low-flying cruise missile or rocket fired by terrorists from a ship off the U.S. coast? For me, the answer unfortunately is a no-brainer. The more plausible threat is the short-range cruise missile or rocket attack, not the distant ICBM. The ICBM is the old Cold War paradigm of what could get Americans killed; the short-range threat is an all-too-believable image of what terrorists could do today, using missiles bought on the black market and homemade chemical or biological warheads.

Okay, now let's test how U.S. defense dollars are actually being spent: For the current fiscal year, Congress has appropriated \$9 billion for the Missile Defense Agency to develop an exotic system based on land, at sea, in air and in space that, in theory, will be able to destroy ICBMs with airborne lasers and kinetic "kill vehicles" traveling at more than 7,000 miles per hour. Meanwhile, the amount being spent specifically for homeland defense against a close-in cruise missile or rocket attack is, as near as I can discover, zero.

That mismatch bothers me. We're spending billions to fight a version of the last war with costly space-based weapons. Meanwhile, we are all but ignoring the real-world weapons that could be used in the next war. I can testify personally to this threat because I was in Kuwait in March 2003 when an Iraqi cruise missile slammed into a shopping center in the middle of town. It was not detected by radar.

The danger of these short-range missile attacks on the United States was highlighted for me recently by Dave Kier, a Lockheed Martin vice president who oversees the company's force-protection projects. You could argue that Lockheed Martin has an interest in sounding the alarm, because it is selling weapons systems that would deal with the threat. But I want to share what Kier said because it describes a problem that, unlike some of the Pentagon's far-off contingencies, is very much here and now.

Kier starts by noting how vulnerable the United States is to a terrorist attack from offshore. He estimates that 75 percent of the U.S. population and 80 percent of its economic wealth are within 200 miles of coastline. The weapons for such an attack are available on the world's arms bazaars. By Kier's count, the potential cruise-missile inventory includes about 6,000 Silkworms and 11,000 Seersuckers. Assuming they were fired from less than 120 miles offshore, it would take them just 11 minutes to reach their targets.

Kier calculates that if a missile with a chemical warhead detonated over Washington, there would be thousands of casualties within the first 10 minutes and tens of thousands after an hour; if the missile were armed with a biological warhead, it would cause hundreds of thousands of casualties in the first hour. If the biological weapon were detonated over New York, casualties in the first five hours would be in the millions, he says.

So what would Lockheed Martin planners do to protect against these missile attacks? Kier proposes a detection system he calls a "passive coherent locator," which is based, believe it or not, on an amplification of existing FM radio signals. He says it would be easy to detect a disturbance in this FM energy field that had the unusual signature of a cruise missile, which is fast but low-flying and therefore doesn't resemble an airplane.

To shoot down the missiles, Kier suggests a combination of existing systems: Aegis missiles from cruisers offshore and Patriot missiles on land. He says a system covering the East Coast, from Washington to Boston, could be in place by 2008 for just over \$1 billion.

Would protecting the U.S. coastline against these short-range missile attacks be worth the cost? Would the systems work as well as Kier asserts? I honestly have no idea. I'm also not thrilled about further militarizing American life to protect us against threats most of us hadn't even imagined. And there are doubtless other solutions, besides Lockheed Martin's, that are worth exploring.

But it makes no sense that the United States is spending \$9 billion a year to defend against an ICBM threat that, for now, is well in the future -- and nothing to protect against real and present dangers. The United States may face threats from Iran or North Korea down the road, but we're at war with al Qaeda today. If the Bush administration is

serious about missile defense, then surely it ought to think harder about stopping the missiles that might actually be used, right now, by America's known enemies.

<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A58463-2005Mar22.html>

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

Los Angeles Times

March 24, 2005

'Intelligence Fiasco' Stirs Up The Korean Peninsula

Some in the South believe U.S. officials overstated the North's nuclear activities. The flap roughly parallels the disputes over Iraq.

By Barbara Demick, Times Staff Writer

SEOUL — At a sensitive time when the United States is trying to build a consensus on North Korea, South Koreans are in a furor over allegations that Washington hyped intelligence about the North's nuclear activities.

The flap, which roughly parallels some of the disputes over Iraq, concerns a trip by National Security Council officials through Asia this year to present evidence to Chinese, Japanese and South Korean officials about North Korea's alleged role in supplying Libya with uranium hexafluoride. The gas is used to make weapons-grade uranium.

In a Washington Post report Sunday, two U.S. officials were quoted as saying the U.S. had covered up a key role played by Pakistan as middleman to bolster the case against North Korea as a dangerous proliferator of nuclear material.

North Korea and Pakistan are known to have exchanged weapons technology for years, so a transaction between them would not have been particularly shocking or new intelligence.

"Another Intelligence Fiasco," is how the English-language Korea Times referred to it in an article Wednesday. The conservative newspaper, Chosun Ilbo, has demanded an investigation.

"If the U.S. administration really offered false information ... Washington's credibility and morality would be in tatters," the Chosun editorialized under the headline, "Did Washington Lie to Seoul?"

Although the South Korean government remained silent, the left-of-center ruling Uri Party issued a tough statement Tuesday accusing the Bush administration of destabilizing the Korean peninsula with its "distorted" intelligence and "oppressive" policies toward the North.

The State Department released a statement Tuesday in Seoul saying, "The United States has not misled allies or anyone else about the matter."

South Korean experts who have reviewed the U.S. evidence of a North Korean sale of uranium hexafluoride to Libya say it is a murky case.

For one, it is difficult to determine whether the uranium hexafluoride that was turned over by Libya as part of its nuclear dismantling originated in North Korea.

Even if it did, experts said, North Korea most likely had supplied the uranium hexafluoride to Pakistan and the rogue network of Abdul Qadeer Khan, that country's top nuclear scientist, had sold it to Libya.

"It looks like these were separate deals. North Korea supplied Pakistan. Pakistan supplied Libya. There is no evidence that North Korea knew anything about Libya," said a South Korean official who asked not to be quoted by name.

The official called the Washington Post story "70% correct."

He said the National Security Council's Asia director, Michael Green, who briefed South Korean officials, did disclose the Pakistani involvement, but at the same time he "aggrandized" North Korea's culpability.

The Libyans are believed to have acquired the uranium hexafluoride in 2001. North Korea has large reserves of natural uranium, but it is unclear whether it has the technology required to produce the gaseous uranium hexafluoride.

According to one expert, a large shipment of uranium hexafluoride was impounded two years ago in China on its way to North Korea, presumably for use in the North's own program to make highly enriched uranium. The incident implies that North Korea cannot produce its own.

In Vienna, scientists with the International Atomic Energy Agency have been testing the uranium hexafluoride turned over by Libya, but have not yet made a determination about its origin.

"Tests have not shown anything indicating that the uranium hexafluoride was from North Korea," a Western diplomat said.

Another Western diplomat said that a U.S. investigation was more thorough, and that through a process of elimination, the American scientists had ruled out other possible countries of origin for the gas.

North Korea announced Feb. 10 that it had developed nuclear weapons and that it would no longer participate in six-country talks over dismantling them.

Many South Koreans are jittery about the Bush administration's tough stance toward the leadership in Pyongyang, the North's capital. Along with the Chinese and Russians, they have been trying to nudge the U.S. into opening a one-on-one dialogue with Pyongyang and laying out more clearly what the benefits would be for the country if it were to dismantle its nuclear program.

Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice last week visited Tokyo, Seoul and Beijing, in large part to rally support for the U.S. line on North Korea, reassuring the region that there were no plans to attack the communist nation. But some of the gains from that trip might have been undone by the intelligence dispute.

"This is the last thing that the administration needs right now," said Daniel Pinkston, a nuclear expert with the Center for Nonproliferation Studies in Monterey, Calif. "It could really undermine U.S. credibility coming in the wake of all the questions about Iraq."

Times staff writer Douglas Frantz in Zurich, Switzerland, contributed to this report.

<http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-uranium24mar24,1,5992836.story?coll=la-headlines-world>

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

New York Times

March 24, 2005

Nuclear Accord Eludes Iran And Europeans

By Elaine Sciolino

PARIS, March 23 - Iran and its European negotiating partners struggled without success on Wednesday to break an impasse on reaching a long-term agreement on nuclear, economic and security cooperation.

But the Iranian side presented new proposals to provide further assurances to the Europeans that Iran's nuclear program is peaceful, and the two sides have agreed to meet again soon, participants said.

"We had rather extensive talks, and we presented a number of ideas on how we can move forward," M. Javad Zarif, ambassador to the United Nations and the leader of the delegation, said in a telephone interview. A European who took part in the meeting said, "By the standards of international group bureaucracies and negotiations, we've moved forward a bit."

Senior negotiators from Iran on one side and France, Germany, Britain and the European Union on the other met at the French Foreign Ministry to review three months of negotiations aimed at providing objective proof that Iran's nuclear program is not intended to produce nuclear weapons.

Among the ideas presented by the Iranians, participants said, was a phased approach including enhanced monitoring and technical guarantees devised to allow Iran to again enrich uranium, a process used in producing nuclear energy and nuclear bombs. But the Europeans reject that approach, arguing that Iran's nuclear activities are so suspicious that the country should never again be allowed to enrich uranium.

Sirus Naseri, a senior Iranian negotiator, told reporters after the talks on Wednesday that Iran would not give in to the European demand that it give up delicate nuclear activities. "This is not something we are prepared to consider," he said. He reiterated the Iranian demand that concrete progress must be made soon. "Time is of the essence," he said.

A European participant said, "We are no further forward on this issue."

The meeting on Wednesday was the first by the negotiating teams since the Bush administration softened its position to allow the Europeans to offer broader economic incentives to Iran. In exchange, the United States has extracted a pledge from the Europeans to refer Iran's case to the United Nations for possible censure or penalties, if the negotiations fail.

The Europeans laid out the difficulties in the talks on March 10 in a confidential, four-page status report that acknowledged that "progress is not as fast as we would wish."

But the report added that recent international support for the European negotiating process, particularly from the United States and Russia, "has strengthened the prospects for a satisfactory outcome."

The report said that the Europeans were proposing that Iran acquire a light-water research reactor to replace a planned heavy-water research reactor, which is designed to produce plutonium that could be used to fuel weapons. According to weapons specialists, plutonium is often preferred to enriched uranium for compact warheads on missiles because it takes less to produce a significant blast. Light-water reactors are considered better for producing electricity than plutonium.

The Europeans are considering dispatching teams of specialists to Iran to investigate the possibility of providing it with such a reactor, a European negotiator said. That plan would ultimately require American support because some of the technologies needed are barred by United States restrictions.

On the security side, the report said the Iranians were seeking a relaxation of controls on goods exported to Iran as well as security guarantees. The Iran nuclear negotiations have already failed once. An agreement to suspend Iran's uranium enrichment activities announced with much fanfare in Tehran in the presence of the foreign ministers of Britain, France and Germany in October 2003 fell apart after Iran interpreted the deal loosely and continued some uranium enrichment activities. The three European nations negotiated a tougher agreement the second time around. Iran's public posture has stiffened in recent weeks. In a news conference in Tehran on March 5, Hassan Rowhani, the midlevel cleric who is in charge of the nuclear negotiating team, threatened that if Iran's nuclear program was referred to the United Nations, Iran would resume enriching uranium. He also said that Iran would cease to abide by the Additional Protocol of the Nonproliferation Treaty. The Additional Protocol substantially expands the ability of the International Atomic Energy Agency, the United Nations' nuclear monitoring agency, to check for clandestine nuclear facilities.

<http://www.nytimes.com/2005/03/24/international/europe/24iran.html?>

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

New York Times

Virus New to Angola Kills 95; Travelers Told to Avoid North

By MICHAEL WINES

Published: March 24, 2005

JOHANNESBURG, March 23 - Health officials urged travelers on Wednesday to avoid Uíge Province, in northern Angola, after the World Health Organization identified the Marburg virus as the source of an epidemic that has killed at least 95 Angolans since October.

The Marburg virus, a close relative of Ebola, has been identified in Uganda, Kenya and Congo, where the last major outbreak was recorded from 1998 to 2000. But it had not been found before in Angola.

In recent months, tens of thousands of refugees from Angola's 21-year civil war have passed through Uíge, returning from neighboring Congo under a repatriation program sponsored by the United Nations. United Nations officials suspended the program last week as evidence of the disease spread.

Three in four Angolan victims were 5 or younger, officials said, and some of the adults were health care workers who had come in direct contact with the bodily fluids of infected persons. At least seven more Angolans are infected with the virus, officials said.

The virus causes a high fever, diarrhea, vomiting and extensive hemorrhaging in the lungs and digestive tract. There is no cure or effective treatment. Victims in the Angola outbreak have generally died within a week of the onset of symptoms, the World Health Organization said Wednesday. The incubation, from infection to onset of the illness, is 5 to 10 days.

The virus was first discovered in 1967, when monkeys imported from Uganda infected laboratory workers in Marburg and Frankfurt, Germany, and Belgrade, Yugoslavia. It is spread largely by direct contact with infected people, and human outbreaks are exceedingly rare.

The latest instance is rivaled only by the 1998 epidemic in Congo, which infected 149 people and killed 123, mostly miners at Durba.

At a news conference on Tuesday, Angolan and United Nations health officials said the virus was first detected in the central hospital in Uíge, but had since spread to villages as far as 31 miles away. The government has begun a public awareness campaign stressing the need for cleanliness to combat the spread.

<http://www.nytimes.com/2005/03/24/international/africa/24angola.html?pagewanted=all>

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)